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Who says that the most important
and perplexing human dilemmas
do not arise in the context of
administrative law? Consider
The Case of Baby Andrew*
One month after the premature birth of her son Andrew,
Peggy Stinson wrote in her journal:
What threatened to be a simple,
private sorrow has changed unex-
pectedly into something so alto-
gether different, so altogether
complicated that thoughts and
feelings tangle hopelessly and
give no guidance.
Andrew is not our baby any-
more - he's been taken over by a
medical bureaucracy. The bureau-
cracy controls Andrew - access to
Andrew, information about Andrew,
decisions about what will happen
to Andrew. It rolls inexorably
onward, oblivious to our attempts
to communicate, participate;
oblivious equally to angry re-
action and attempts to reconcile.
If this sounds bad, it's not half so bad as it will be if
President Reagan gets his way. The Stinsons' problem was that they had
doctors who followed a rigid ethic of preserving life at virtually any cost,
and they could not get their son out of the hands of their doctors. Now,
however, the president who promised to cut back on the intrusion of big
government into the private lives of American citizens is taking steps to
ensure that even when parents, doctors, and a hospital "Infant Care Review
Committee" agree on the best course of action for an infant born severely
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handicapped, there will be another layer of bureaucracy - the federal
government - to step inand see that the baby is treated, regardless of
what the parents and their doctors think.
The Long Dying of Baby Andrew consists of the daily journals in
which Peggy and Robert Stinson recorded their private thoughts between
December 1976 and June 1977. At the beginning of that period, Mrs. Stinson
was twenty-four weeks pregnant and the pregnancy was going seriously wrong.
The Stinsons contemplated an abortion to avoid the risk of a life-
threatening hemorrhage, but decided against it. A few days later the
pregnancy began to miscarry. Mrs. Stinson was rushed to the hospital (in
a town she does not identify) where, to everyone's surprise, a baby was
born alive, weighing one pound twelve ounces. The doctors expected the
baby to die, but Andrew struggled on.
Against the Stinsons' better judgment, they were persuaded to allow
him to be taken from the local community hospital to a downtown specialist
pediatric hospital with a neonatal intensive care unit. There, despite
a host of problems including periodic fits, infections, and a very uncer-
tain prognosis for mental development, Andrew was put on a respirator and
all the resources of modern medical technology were used to keep him alive.
The Stinsons repeatedly made it plain that they did not want these heroic
measures to be taken. Their wishes were ignored. Not until June 14 did
Andrew die. Mrs. Stinson wrote in her journal, "Modern medicine makes
possible a sad new epitaph: He died too late for grief." The hospital sent
the Stinsons a statement listing charges of $104,403.20. The doctor in charge
told them: 'Me were all lucky to get out of this as easily as we did."
The most unusual thing about Andrew Stinson's case is that he had
educated, articulate parents who were angry at what had happened and chose
to write about it. More often, parents either do not fully understand what
is happening to their baby, or they feel so powerless that they do not even
protest. For instance, in doing research on this issue, we received a letter
from a distinguished British pediatrician describing a visit to an American
university hospital. During a ward round in the neonatal intensive care unit,
an eighteen-month-old infant suffered a cardiac arrest and was resuscitated.
The pediatrician was told that the infant had no forebrain, which means it had
no potential for intelligent life. Moreover this cardiac arrest was the
infant's twentieth - it had been resuscitated each time. When the British
pediatrician expressed his amazement at such a practice, his American
colleague privately agreed that it was both pointless and very expensive,
but said that the pressure from "pro-life" groups and the law was so great
that he felt he must persist in attempting to preserve life.
The Stinsons' book is timely, for it presents the parents' point
of view at a time when the Reagan administration is trying to impose its
conservative and religiously motivated moral attitudes on the rest of the
community. Apparently unable to do anything to stop women from making their
own decisions about terminating pregnancy (unless the women happen to be poor),
Reagan has shown his support for the pro-I ife groups by interfering with
family decisions in that most tragic, personal, and delicate of situations,
the birth of a severely handicapped infant.
Reagan's actions stem from the now-famous "Baby Doe" case
(not to be confused with the more recent case of Baby Jane Doe in New York).
The original Baby Doe was born on April 9, 1982, in Bloomington, Indiana,
with Down's syndrome (also known as mongolism) and a blockage in the
digestive system. Without surgery to remove the blockage, such a baby
will die. The prospects for successful surgery were fair, but even if
surgery were successful, of course, the underlying mental retardation
would be unaffected. For this reason the parents refused to consent to
surgery. Both the county court and the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the
parents' right to make this decision. Before an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court could be mounted, Baby Doe died.
Public reaction to this case began with outraged protests from
the "right-to-life" movement, but soon spread beyond these circles, with
The Washinqton Post and The New York Times both editorially deploring the
decision. Letters of protest began to flow into Congress and the White House.
The White House responded with unusual speed. In a memorandum dated April 30,
1982, President Reagan ordered Richard Schweiker, Secretary of Health and
Human Services, to ensure that federal laws protecting the rights of handi-
capped citizens were being adequately enforced. In particular, the president
instructed Secretary Schweiker to notify all who provide health care that
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 forbids medical institutions
receiving federal funds to withhold from handicapped citizens, simply because
they are handicapped, any benefit or service that would ordinarily be pro-
vided to people without handicaps. Regulations under this law, the
president continued, prohibit hospitals receiving federal assistance from
discriminating against the handicapped. President Reagan then instructed
the attorney general to report on constitutional and legal means of preventing
the withholding from the handicapped of potentially life-saving treatment.
His memorandum concluded with the following words:
Our Nation's commitment to equal pro-
tection of the law will have little
meaning if we deny such protection to
those who have not been blessed with
the same physical or mental gifts we
too often take for granted. I support
Federal laws prohibiting discrimination
against the handicapped, and remain
determined that such laws will be
vigo,-ously enforced.
In accordance with the president's instructions, the Secretary of
Health Services sent 6,800 hospitals a "Notice to Health Care Providers."
The notice told hospital administrators that it was
unlawful for a recipient of Federal
financial assistance to withhold from
a handicapped infant nutritional sus-
tenance or medical or surgical treat-
ment required to correct a life-
threatening condition if
(1) the withholding is based on the
fact that the infant is handicapped;
and
(2) the handicap does not render
treatment or nutritional sustenance
contra-indicated.
Hospital administrators were told that they would have federal government
funds cut off if they allowed handicapped infants to die when nonhandi-
capped infants in similar circumstances would be saved. The "Notice"
was saying, in effect, that no matter how severe an infant's handicap
might be, the efforts made to preserve its life must be no less than the
efforts that would be made to preserve the life of a nonhandicapped infant
in an otherwise similar condition.
When confronted with complex ethical questions, one is tempted
to look for a simple answer. The Reagan administration has found its
simple answer in the idea that all human life is of equal worth. That is
the answer that lies behind the "Notice," and its appeal to a principle of
"nondiscrimination" against infants born with severe handicaps.
This simple line about the equal worth of all human lives is the
basis of Reagan's own excursion into moral philosophy, his article "Abortion
and the Conscience of the Nation," in the spring 1983 issue of The Human Life
Review. After writing proudly of his action in applying civil rights regu-
lations to "protect" handicapped newborns, he quotes both the Declaration
of Independence and Abraham Lincoln to make the point that we must regard
all lives as being of equal value.
We shall soon see that this position cannot be taken seriously.
No one, not even Reagan's own surgeon general, Dr. C. Everett Koop, a man
much admired by right-to-l ife groups and praised by Reagan himself in the
article just mentioned, can carry it out in practice. But to appreciate this,
we must first return to the story of the administration's response to the
Baby Doe case.
Strong as its language was, the "Notice" was not sufficient for
the White House. In March 1983 the Department of Health and Human Services
therefore issued a more forceful follow-up regulation. Officially, the new
regulation had the contradictory title "Interim Final Rule," but it has
become known as the "Baby Doe guidelines." These guidelines specified that
a poster was to be conspicuously displayed in each delivery ward, maternity
ward, pediatric ward, and intensive care nursery. The department sent out
large, seventeen-by-fourteen-inch posters with heavy black lettering which
read as follows:
NOTICE
Department of Health and Human Services
Office for Civil Rights
DISCRIMINATORY FAILURE TO FEED
AND CARE FOR HANDICAPPED IN-
FANTS IN THIS FACILITY IS PRO-
HIBITED BY FEDERAL LAW.
SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION
ACT OF 1973 STATES THAT
"NO OTHERWISE QUALIFIED HAND-
ICAPPED INDIVIDUAL SHALL, SOLELY
BY REASON OF HANDICAP, BE EXCLUDED
FROM PARTICIPATION IN, BE DENIED
THE BENEFITS OF, OR BE SUBJECTED
TO DISCRIMINATION UNDER ANY PRO-
GRAM OR ACTIVITY RECEIVING FEDERAL
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE."
Any person having knowledge that
a handicapped infant is being discrim-
inatorily denied food or customary
medical care should immediately con-
tact:
Handicapped Infant Hotline
US Department of Health and
Human Services
Washington, D.C. 20201
Phone 800-368-1019
(Available 24 hours a day)
TTY Capability
In Washington, D.C., call
863-0100
OR
Your State Child Protective
Agency.
Federal Law prohibits retaliation
or intimidation against any person
who provides information about possible
violations of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.
Identity of callers will be held
confidential.
Failure to feed and care for infants
may also violate the criminal and civil
laws of your state.
Later in the year, the administration worked out the finer details
of how to enforce the notice. It was decided to set up a special "Baby Doe
Squad." According to a March 4, 1983, memo from the deputy director of pro-
gram operations to Betty Lou Dotson, director of the Office of Civil Rights
within Health and Human Services, the Baby Doe Squad was to consist of "Cadres
especially selected and trained" who would be provided with individually
numbered copies ef 'Baby Doe complaint" investigation procedures, which were
not to be duplicated or released outside the Office for Civil Rights. De-
pending on the nature of the complaint, one, two, or three squad members would
be immediately dispatched to the hospital site, where they would have power
to demand hospital records and to interview all relevant personnel. These
'special squad assignments" were to "take precedence over any and all assign-
ments."
The Baby Doe guidelines incensed many of the nation's most senior
pediatricians - not surprisingly, since they invited all and sundry to make
confidential complaints about the way doctors treated their patients. As
a result the American Academy of Pediatrics, an association of twenty-four
thousand pediatricians, joined with the National Association of Children's
Hospitals and the Children's Hospital National Medical Center, in Washington,
D.C. to contest the regulations in the courts.
Among the grounds for opposition to the guidelines was the question
of their scope. The American Academy of Pediatrics submitted affidavits
describing medical conditions which are, it said, "simply not treatable";
shouid we still try to prolong the lives of these infants, as we would, of
course, if the infants did not have the conditions in question? In other
words, the academy was asking, are doctors now supposed to do everything in
their power to prolong all infant lives, no matter what the prospects?
The affidavits referred to three conditions. The first is
anencephaly. This means "no brain" and refers to a condition that occurs
approximately once in every two thousand births. The infant is born with
most or all of its brain missing. Many of these babies die at birth or very
soon after, but some have lived for a week or two, and it would be possible,
with modern artificial support systems, to keep them alive even longer.
The absence, or virtual absence, of a brain means that even if such infants
could be kept alive indefinitely, they would never become conscious or
respond in any way to other human beings.
The second condition is an intracranial hemorrhage - less
technically, a bleeding in the head. Dr. Robert Parrott, director of the
Children's Hospital National Medical Center, described some cases as
"infants who have such severe bleeding in their heads that they will never
breathe without mechanical respiratory assistance yet / sic / never will
have the capacity for cognitive behavior." (Andrew Stinson-appeared to have
an intracranial hemorrhage in the first month of his life, although his par-
ents were given conflicting information about the severity of the hemorrhage
and its likely consequences.)
The third condition is one in which the infant lacks a sub-
stantial part of its digestive tract, for instance its intestine and
bowels. The infant cannot be fed by mouth, for it will not obtain any-
thing of nutritional value. It is not possible to correct the condition
by surgery. Feeding such infants by means of a drip directly into the
bloodstream will keep them alive, but nutritional deficiencies are
likely and the long-term prospects are poor.
In mentioning these three conditions, the academy was sitggest-
ing that the guidelines were, at best, unclear on whether in these cases
infants might be allowed to die without receiving life-sustaining treat-
ment; or at worst, the guidelines would direct that such life-sustaining
treatment be given, despite the apparent futility of such treatment.
The hearing took place before Judge Gerhard Gesell, It is worth
examining the transcript in some detail, because it reveals the thinking of
those within the administration who were responsible for the Baby Doe
guidelines.
At the hearing the Department of Health and Human Services denied
that the Interim Final Rule would compel doctors to provide life-sustaining
treatment in extreme cases. The chief spokesman for the department's
position was Dr. C. Everett Koop, the surgeon general, an experienced pedi-
atric surgeon and a strong advocate of the right-to-life viewpoint. Dr. Koop
told the court that he had been involved in the decision to issue the
"Notice to Health Care Providers," and the subsequent formulation of the
Interim Final Rule. Referring to the case of a child having "essentially
no intestine," Dr. Koop said:
...the regulations never intended that
such a child should be put on hyper-
alimentation / i.e., artificially
nourished and carried for a year and
a half.
Incidentally, I was the first physi-
cian that ever did that, so I know where-
of I speak. And we would consider
customary care in that child the pro-
vision of a bed, of food by mouth, know-
ing that it was not going to be nutritious,
but not just shutting off the care of that
child.. .nor do we intend to say that this
child should be carried on intravenous
fluids for the rest of its life.
Dr. Koop made a similar remark about one of the other cases
mentioned by the academy:
When you talk about a baby born without a
brain, I suspect you meant an anencaphalic
child and we would not attempt to interfere
with anyone dealing with that child. We
think tt shosld be given loving
attention and would expect it to
expire in a short time.
r/u r. Kocip, ft was apparenty pfain common sense that one dfd not attempt
to prolong the lives of infants born with such hopeless conditions. We
agree. But is not this "plain cormon sense" at odds with the view that all
human lives are of equal worth?
Since it clearly is possible, by means of artificial feeding and
respiration, to prolong the lives of anencephalic infants by several days,
perhaps even weeks or months, anyone who believes that the life of an
anenceph-.'ic infant is of the same value as the life of a normal human
being should consider it wrong to decide not to take any steps to prolong
life in these cases. Similarly, those who hold this view would also seem
to be committed to advocating life-sustaining measures for infants born
without intestines. For example, in the passage quoted above, Dr. Koop
referred to the possibility of "carrying" an infant without an intestine
for "a year and a half"; yet Dr. Koop did not advocate that infants born
without an intestine should be kept alive for as long as possible. (in
fact it is possible for children being artificially fed to survive consider-
ably longer than this, but the precise period is not relevant here.) Why
does Dr. Koop not think such infants should be kept alive as long as
possible? Would he not think an eighteen-month extension of life worth-
while for a normal child? Would he not think it worthwhile for a normal
adult? If he would, the obvious explanation for his different view in the
first case is that he does not regard the life of an artificially nourished
infant as being of the same worth as that of a normal infant or a normal
adult.
Is there any other possible explanation for the views expressed
by Dr. Koop? The way in which the Department of Health and Human Services
formulated its Interim Final Rule suggested that the department was
appealing to a standard of "customary medical care." This standard was
explicit in the reference, in the notice to be posted in the hospitals, to
"infants discriminatorily denied food or customary medical care." It may be
that the department was seeking to deflect criticism by claiming that it was
not asking for heroic measures or extraordinary means, but merely the usual
form of medical care. If the department thought that in this way it could
avoid the ambiguities and difficulties of that distinction, however, it soon
received a rude awakening. For the Department of Health and Human Services
the appeal to "customary medical care" posed a special problem which it
really ought to have foreseen. The problem was that the department, in docu-
menting the need for new guidelines on the treatment of handicapped infants,
had clearly established that the treatments it was attempting to mandate were
not customary.
The difficulty the department was in emerged very clearly at the
hearing before Judge Gerhard Gesell . As we have seen, the chief witness
for the department at that hearing was Dr. C. Everett Koop, surgeon general
of the United States, and a key person in the drawing up of the Interim Final
Rule. Judge Gesell asked Dr. Koop whether there was documentation of the
problems they were discussing. Dr. Koop gave a lengthy reply which included
the following passages:
There was a very telling survey done
by the surgical section of the Academy
of Pediatrics .... At the time of the
survey there were approximately Fix
hundred members of that surgical
section. I cannot remember how many
were questioned there, but it was over
half and that was reported in a journal
called Pediatrics in the year 1977 and
there it was very clear that a very
large proportion of pediatric surgeons
in this country, and there was also a
little section about pediatricians, were
perfectly willing to acquiesce to the
request of a family not to treat a child
if they didn't want that child, and many
of the circumstances that were mentioned
in that survey were very simple procedures
such as simple intestinal obstruction, not
associated with any other anomaly, and as
I recall, fourteen percent of the surgeons
questioned said if indeed the parents said
they didn't want the child operated upon
even though they knew it would be certain
death, and it was a simple, easy thing
and a normal child would be the result of
the procedure, they said they would
acquiesce to the family's concern.
And in the President's Advisory
Commission on Biomedical Ethics...there
are two other surveys mentioned...which I
think are also very telling. One was a
survey of pediatricians in the West who
said that the majority of them would ac-
quiesce to the parents' request not to
operate upon the child if they didn't want
that child, and in a Massachusetts survey
of pediatricians a majority of those who
answered the survey said that they would
not even suggest an operation in a child
who had Down's -yndrome, so I think it is
widespread.
Our reason for quoting Koop's testimony at this length is that it
served as a preliminary to the following series of devastating questions from
Judge Gesell:
Judge Gesell: So what is it that you
consider customary medical care? I mean
how would you as a practicing physician,
how would you understand that?
Dr. Koop: It would have to be - the
reasons that those regulations don't go
into chapter and verse for everything
that occurs in a child is because that
would result in a textbook.
Judge Gesell: They don't go into anything?
Dr. Koop: They don't go into anything.
Judge Gesell: So what does the regulation
mean when it says "customary medical care"?
Dr. Koop: Well, I think that every physician
knows what is essentially customary.
Judge Gesell: Would you mind telling me?
Dr. Koop: Yes. It differs for every case
but let's take the ones that you mentioned
a moment ago when you talked about a child
who is born without an intestine.... We
would consider customary care in that child
the provision of a bed, of food by mouth,
knowing that it was not going to be nutritious,
but not just shutting off the care of that
child...nor do we intend to say that this
child should be carried on intravenous fluids
for the rest of its life.
Judge Gesell: How are the number /sic: read
"members"? / of your organizations, the pediatric
associations to find out what you think is
right?
Dr. Koop: I think we all essentially agree,
sir.
Judge Gesell: Is it written down anywhere?
Dr. Koop: No, but again it's customary.
Judge Gesell: The affidavits seem to indi-
cate that there's some disagreement between
physicians as to what is customary care ....
Poor Dr. Koop. Having argued that the regulations were needed
because a very large proportion of pediatricians were ready to go along with
the wishes of parents and not operate on a Down's syndrome infant - precisely
the result the regulation had been devised to prevent - he was in an
impossible situation in trying to maintain that all the regulation demanded
was "customary medical care."
The Department of Health and Human Services soon had a second chance
to explain its stance on the type of case we have been considering. Judge
Gerhard Gesell found in favor of the Academy of Pediatrics and its co-
plaintiffs on the grounds that the department had, by issuing the regulation
without allowing a period for public comment, failed to comply with the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, an act designed to curb
bureaucratic actions taken without consultation and notice to those affected.
The department therefore issued, on July 5, 1983, a new "Proposed Rule." The
new rule was essentially similar to the ill-fated Interim Final Rule, but
it was issued with considerably more information on the circumstances in
which it was to apply, In particular, it was stated that:
Section 504 does not compel medical per-
sonnel to attempt to perform impossible
or futile acts or therapies. Thus,
Section 504 does not require the imposition
of futile therapies which merely temporarily
prolong the process of dyin of an infant
born terminally will / sic /, such as a
child born with anencephaly or intra-
cranial bleeding. Such medical decisions,
by medical personnel and parents, concern-
ing whether to treat, and if so, what form
the treatment should take, are outside the
scope of Section 504. The Department recog-
nizes that reasonable medical judgments can
differ when evaluating these difficult,
individual cases.
Here the department takes the common-sense view that it is not obligatory
to keep alive infants with anencephaly or intracranial bleeding. It is
interesting to see how the department tries to take this view without basing
it on the fact that infants with these conditions have no prospect of a
reasonable quality of life. What the department suggests is that in these
cases treatment is "futile" and will "merely temporarily prolong the process
of dying" of an infant born terminally ill. Whether a treatment is futile
in this way is, the department states, a "medical decision" and "reasonable
medical judgments can differ" in these cases. The department seems to be
saying that it does not wish to interfere in these "medical decisions."
Since this remains the position of the department n the final version of its
rule, published on January 9, 1984, its approach requires close scrutiny.
The department's position cannot be maintained. As we have seen,
sophisticated modern medical techniques could indefinitely prolong the
lives of children with anencaphaly or intracranial bleeding. The judgment
that someone whose life could be indefinitely prolonged by available medical
means is "terminally ill" and therefore should not have his or her life
prolonged is not a medical judgment; it is an ethical judgment about the
desirability of prolonging that particular life.
Could the department defend its view by saying that whether a patient
is dying is a medical judgment, based on the fact that the patient can survive
only with the help of medical treatment? Such a test would be far too broad.
By this standard, a patient suffering from diabetes would be "terminally ill"
and it would not be required to provide "futile" insulin therapy. The fact
that no one in his or her right mind would regard insulin therapy for a
diabetic as "futile" should make us realize that judgments about the futility
of treatment are not purely medical judgments based on the prospect of the
underlying condition being cured. At present we cannot cure diabetes, any more
than we can cure anencaphaly, or intracranial bleeding, or the absence of
an intestine. In all these conditions, the patient will remain, for his or
her entire Iife, dependent for survival on continuing medical treatment. The
difference between diabetes and the other three conditions is, of course,
that the diabetic will be able to enjoy a near-normal life, while no matter
how much we prolong the life of the infant with severe intracranial bleeding,
for instance, the infant's life will always remain devoid of everything that we
regard as making life worthwhile.
As we read on through the "supplementary information" issued by the
Department of Health and Human Services it becomes still more clear that,
despite protestations to the contrary, the department's position is based on
thinly veiled judgments that some lives are not worth living. The department's
statement continues:
Section 504 simply preserves the decision-
making process customarily undertaken by
physicians in any treatment decision: will the
treatment be medically beneficial to the
patient and are those benefits out-weighed
by any medical risk associated with the
treatment? It is only when non-medical
considerations, such as subjective judgments
that an unrelated handicap makes a person's
life not worth living, are interjected in
the decision-making process that the Section
504 concerns arise.
In issuing the January 9 "Final Rule," the department indicated that so far
as the provision of all "medically beneficial treatment" is concerned, "the
Department's position remains unchanged." The problem with this unchanged
position is that we need to decide what treatments are "medically beneficial
to the patient." The simple answer, and the only answer that is consistent
with the idea that all human life is of equal worth, is that all treatments
which prolong life are beneficial. Yet this is clearly not the answer the
department would give: it does not regard it as beneficial to prolong the
lives of infants born with virtually no brain, or who have suffered severe
intracranial bleeding. Why is this not "medically beneficial to the patient'
in the same way that giving insulin is medically beneficial to the diabetic?
Once again, the answer must be that it is not medically beneficial
to prolong the lives of infants who will never experience anything, and will
remain alive but in a state without feelings or awareness, unable to enjoy
their lives in any way. Plainly, the prolongation of such a life is not
"medically beneficial" because it is not beneficial in any sense. Karen Ann
Quinlan, the New Jersey woman who has been in an irreversible coma since
1975, has not benefited from the fact that her life has been prolonged for
many years. She has not been aware of the extra years of life she has
had, and thus has had no benefit from them.
Similarly, prolonging the life of an infant without a brain does
the infant no good because it is not possible for the infant to benefit from
the additional period of life. This is not, however, a medical judgment.
It is, quite obviously, a "non-medical consideration" based on the judgment
that the handicap - in this case, the virtual absence of a brain -
"makes a person's life not worth living." The department seems to think
that such judgments are "subjective" and must not be "interjected in the
decision-making process"; yet its own position is based on just this type
of judgment.
Admittedly, the department does refer to judgments ab.,ut "an
unrelated handicap," and in criticizing its position we have ,tot taken
account of the stipulation that the judgment be about a Fdndicap that is
"unrelated." But it is difficult to see exactly what this means or how
It can make a difference. Presumably it is supposed to be wrong to take
account of a handicap unrelated to the treatment needed to keep the infant
alive; but how do we define what the handicap is? This may seem clear
enough in a case like that of Baby Doe, where Down's syndrome is the
reason for not operating on the blockage in the digestive system. But
what about the case of, say, an intracranial bleeding? The treatment needed
to keep the infant alive might be artificial respiration. A baby who was
having breathing problems, but was otherwise normal, would certainly be put
ona respirator; the baby who, as Dr. Parrott put it, "never will have the
capacity for cognitive behavior" would not be put on a respirator.
But if the lack of any "capacity for cognitive behavior" is a
factor in the decision to put the baby on the respirator, this would have to
be a "subjective judgment that an unrelated handicap makes a person's life
not worth living." As such, it should give rise to what the department calls
"Section 504 concerns." Yet apparently the department does not think it does.
On the other hand, the department presumably would think that "Section 504
concerns" arise even in some cases where the decision not to sustain life is
made because of a handicap that is directly related to the form of treatment
- for instance, if a doctor did not give insulin to a diabetic patient
because in the doctor's judgment diabetes is a handicap that makes life not
worth living. Thus, whether the life-sustaining treatment is or is not
related to the patient's handicap cannot be, even in the department's view,
a crucial factor in whether a decision not to prolong life is a case of
discriminating against the handicap.
The Department of Health and Human Services received 16,739 comments
on the proposed rule it issued on July 5, 1983. Ninety-seven percent were in
support of the rule, many written in virtually identical terms as a
response to appeals by groups like the "Christian Action Council." One
hundred and forty-one pediatricians or newborn care specialists sent in
comments: of these, 72 percent opposed the rule. The American Academy of
Pediatrics has also made a lengthy submission, which includes documentation
of the harm done to hospitals trying to cope with medical and human crises
by sudden descents of the "Baby Doe Squad." For instance, at Vanderbilt
University Hospital, a "hotline" call led to three investigators and a
neonatologist examining, after midnight, each infant in the facility, and
diverting the hard-pressed hospital staff from patient care for a total of
fifty-four staff-hours. The neonatologist described the hospital's care
as "exemplary." More dramatic still i3 a comment quoted from a New Mexico
pediatrician:
Because of the fear I had in being "reported,"
I recently spent one agonizing hour trying
to resuscitate a newborn who had no larynx,
and many other congenital anomalies. The
sad part was that both the parents in the
delivery room watched this most difficult
ordeal. It was obvious to me that this was
no way a viable child but I felt compelled
to carry on this way out of fear someone in
the hospital would "turn me in," I am sure
that you who sit in Washington are not faced
with such difficult decisions at two o'clock
AM.
This comment becomes especially ominous in the light of the Stinsons' experi-
ence. Not for one hour but for nearly six months they had to stand by while
doctors kept their tiny, suffering infant alive. (At one point a doctor
told them that Andrew must "hurt like hell" every time he breathed.)
Comments like this appear to have had some effect on the wording
of the Final Rule issued on January 9. Chastened by the hostile reaction
to its earlier attempts, the department retreated from the heavy-handed
intimidation that had characterized previous versions of the rule. This
gradual retreat is reflected in the size and positioning of the notice to be
posted in hospitals: the notice sent out with the March 1983 Interim Rule
measured seventeen inches by fourteen; the July Proposed Rule required the
notice to be no smaller than eleven by eight and a half inches; now the notice
can be as small as seven by five inches. Moreover the notice does not have
to be posted where parents and visitors can see it, but only at nurses'
stations where it can be seen by health care professionals. The wording of
the notice has been toned down: for instance, the reference to violations
of state criminal and civil laws has been deleted on the grounds that the
statement is "unnecessary" and "potentially inflammatory."
The most significant innovation in the new rule of January 9 is
the suggestion that hospitals may wish to set up "Infant Care Review Committees"
which would discuss problem cases, and with which the department would consult,
in the first instance, if any alleged violations were reported to it,
This suggestion picks up a recommendation of the American Academy of Pedi-
atrics, and is clearly another attempt to conciliate.
That the department should seek the views of those on the spot
before rushing to its own decision is, of course, desirable; but the
department makes it clear, beneath its conciliatory language, that it is
still the boss. As Dr. Koop said at the press conference at which the
Final Rule was announced: "The rules do no more than continue to pro-
vide an effective method of enforcing Section 504 in connection with the
health care of handicapped infants."
The new rule itself says that "the Department does not seek to
take over medical-decision-making regarding health care for handicapped
infants" but then adds that the parents and physicians must act within the
framework set by law, including the Section 504 prohibition of discrimina-
tion. The department specifically rejects the suggestion that with the
review boards in place, the government could refrain from playing a role
in enforcing this statute with regard to handicapped infants,
So far as the interpretation of Section 504 is concerned, the new
rule contains only minor changes. Not surprisingly, references to
"customary medical care" have been dropped. The criterion of "medically
beneficial treatment" must now bear all the weight of distinguishing cases
like anencephaly (which the department still says neeO not be treated) from
cases of Down's syndrome with an intestinal blockage (which the department
says should be treated). We have seen that this distinction cannot really
be a medical judgment, yet the new rule continues to insist that "present
or anticipated physical or mental impairments of an infant" are not a
permissible basis for withholding treatment.
The department no longer discusses intracranial bleeding as a
case in which treatment is not "medically beneficial" because the severity
of such bleeding varies greatly. Instead the department discusses spina
bifida, a condition in which the infant is born with an open wound on its
back exposing the spinal cord. Depending on the size and location of the
wound, the child may be paralyzed from the waist down, lack bowel and
bladder control, and be mentally retarded.
The recent and much publicized case of Baby Jane Doe is about
an infant with this condition, although Jane Doe also has microcephaly, an
abnormally small head, which in itself is a sign of severe mental retarda-
tion. With so poor a prognosis for a minimally satisfactory quality of
life, Jane Doe's parents decided not to do everything possible to increase
her prospects for survival. In this decision they were supported by
Jane Doe's physicians and neurosurgeons, as well as by social workers and
clergymen. Yet an unknown caller alerted a right-to-life lawyer who
managed to drag the baby's parents through all three levels of the New York
State court system before the suit was thrown out by the New York Court
of Appeals. Even then, Dr. Koop and his "Baby Doe Squad" threatened to
cut off federal funds from Stony Brook Hospital if it were found to have
"discriminated" against Jafie Doe on grounds of her multiple handicaps.
According to a report in the London Sunday Times, Dr. Koop has said that he
is not so much interested in Baby Jane Doe as in "the idea of her" as a way
of "fighting for the principle of this country that every life is individually
and uniquely sacred."
Spina bifida is one of the most cormon birth defects. It is contro-
versial because in many countries, including Britain and Australia, it is
standard practice to allow the more severely afflicted babies to die. Less
severe cases are operated on and given every available assistance, often
with the result that the children go on to lead fulfilling lives; the
remainder, if the parents agree, are not operated upon, and if infections
appear or pneumonia develops, these children are not given antibiotics.
There is no hypocrisy or pretense about this practice of selection,
which has been accepted by the British Department of Health and Social
Service. The practice derives largely from the work of Dr. John Lorber of
Sheffield. For several years Lorber and his colleagues in Sheffield treated
every case of spina bifida as vigorously as possible. Then, looking back
on the results of more than a thousand cases, Lorber decided that this
was a mistake; in many cases, the lives he had saved were not worth living
and the burden on families was sometimes barely tolerable. Lorber switched
to treating about 25 percent of the cases brought before him, obtaining
the parents' consent for whatever course he followed: in advocating this
policy in medical journals he has stated candidly that he does not operate
on the more severely affected infants because he thinks it better that they
do not survive beyond infancy.
The Reagan administration is now insisting that treatment for spina
bifida infants may be withheld only if there is a medical judgment that it
is "futile" and "not of medical benefit to the infant." If this were
taken seriously in Great Britain, thousands of infants who would be allowed
to die there would survive, often against the wishes of the parents. Appar-
ently the Reagan administration believes that infants must be treated even
if in the opinion of the parents, the doctors, and the hospital Infant Care
Review Committee the life thus "saved" will be so miserable that the infant
would be better off dead. "Medical benefit," remember, is not supposed to
involve considerations of the quality of life.
In practice it is very likely that the new rule will simply widen
the already considerable gap between appearance and reality in American
medicine. American doctors will start to disguise their inevitable judg-
ments about quality of life under the cloak of "medical judgments" about
the "futility" of treatment. A cynic might see the new rule as an open
invitation to doctors to do just this, thus defusing the politically damag-
ing war of words between pediatricians and pro-life forces.
Those who reject judgments about quality of life should not for-
get that pregnant women who run an abnormal risk of carrying a defective
child are standardly advised to have a prenatal test with a view to
abortion if the test does reveal that the infant will be handicapped. These
women are obviously making quality-of-life judgments, and presumably will
continue to be allowed to do so.
The Stinsons nicely bring out the moral absurdity of the present
legal situation and the ethical attitudes that support it. Before
Andrew was born, they could have legally had an abortion and planned another
pregnancy. Had Andrew not been born at twenty-four weeks a legal abortion
would still have been possible for another two weeks. Yet once Andrew
emerged from the womb, the Stinsons lost control of the situation. Why?
The pro-life groups are right about one thing: the location of the baby
inside or outside the womb cannot make such a crucial moral difference.
We cannot coherently hold that it is all right to kill a fetus a week
before birth, but as soon as the baby is born everything must be done to
keep it alive. The solution, however, is not to accept the pro-life view that
the fetus is a human being with the same moral status as yours or mine. The
solution is the very opposite: to abandon the idea that all human life is of
equal worth.
The statement will assuredly bring letters saying that once we
abandon our belief in the equal worth of all human life we are well on the
way to Nazism and to ridding the world of all social undesirables, political
undesirables, and racial undesirables. The Nazi parallel is an old bogey
which has no historical basis.* But history apart, the unequal worth
of human life is really so obvious that we have only to cast off our
religious or ideological blinkers to see it as plain as day. If the life
of a human being is more valuable than the life of, say, a cabbage, this
must be because the human being has qualities like consciousness, rationality,
autonomy, and self-awareness which distinguish human beings from cabbages.
How, then, can we pretend that the life of a human being with all these
distinctive qualities is of no greater value than the life of a human being
who, tragically, has never had and never will have these qualities? As we
said earlier: in practice, not even Dr. C. Everett Koop treats the life of
a baby without a brain as if it were of the same value as the life of a
normal child.
This insight is not a solution to all the ethical problems raised
by the treatment of severely handicapped newborns. Just what the solution
might be is not within the scope of this article. At a minimum, though, any
fair and honest solution must recognize that those who will care for the
child throughout its life - if it survives - should have the largest say in
what steps are taken to keep it alive. Midway through Andrew Stinson's life,
at a time when it looked as if he might survive but be severely handicapped,
Peggy Stinson wrote bitterly in her journal:
See the comments criticizing such comparisons by Lucy Dawidowicz in "Bio-
medical Ethics and the Shadow of Nazism," Hastings Center Report, vol. 6,
no. 4 (August 1976), Special supplement, pp. 2-4, 9-10.
One thing is clear enough - Bob will
keep on writing, Bob will keep on teaching
his classes, sitting in his office, talking
to his students, correcting his exams
his life will go on much the same no
matter what happens to Andrew. That's be-
cause he's not the one who will take care
of Andrew.
Neither will any of those doctors.
As Mrs. Stinson later realized, this wasn't entirely fair to her
husband; as so often happens in these situations, the Stinsons' marriage
was coming apart under the strain. Still, the essential point stands:
no one has the right to impose on anyone else the lifetime burden of caring
for a severely handicapped child who has no reasonable prospect of a satis-
fying life. This point applies with special force to the Reagan administra-
tion, which has been cutting back on facilities for state care for the
handicapped at the very time when it is taking steps to overrule decisions
by the parents - even joint decisions by parents and doctors who, unlike
the Stinsons and their doctors, are in agreement about the best course to
take in the individual circumstances they are facing. The administration's
new rule means that not even the support of the hospital's Infant Care Review
Committee will be sufficient to exclude the possibility of interference by
outsiders motivated by their own special brand of ideological or religious
zeal.
On July 4, 1984, the New York Times announced (p. 1, col. 1)
that liberal and conservative Senators, hospital officials, civil rights
advocates and anti-abortion groups had reached tentative agreement on a
proposal to amend the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974
by incorporating a new standard for treating severely handicapped infants.
In a copyrighted article under the byline of Robert Pear, the Times
reported that the proposal, with which the Surgeon General concurred,
would, if enacted:
"redefine child neglect and abuse
to include the 'withholding of medically
indicated treatment from disabled in-
fants with life-threatening conditions.'
The 'medically indicated treatment' in-
cludes those steps that, in the judgment
of treating physicians, are 'most
likely to be effective in ameliorating
or correcting' all of a handicapped
infant's life-threatening conditions.
'But doctors and hospitals would not have
to make heroic efforts !- save a baby's life
in any of these situations, as set forth in
the proposed Senate amendment:
'The infant is chronically and irre-
versibly comatose. '
'The provision of such treatment would
merely prolong dying, not be effective in
ameliorating or correcting all of the in-
fant's life-threatening conditions or
otherwise be futile in terms of the sur-
vival of the infant.'
'The provision of such treatment would
be virtually futile in terms of the sur-
vival of the infant, and the treatment
itself under such circumstances would be
inhumane.'"
